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ABSTRACT 
The ownership of, and rights to, coastal waters are exhibited on 
a cumulative scale ranging from commons-like to private use. As an 
example of a natural resource with complex and interlinked ecosys-
tems, coastal waters give rise to many kinds of legal norms and pol-
icy instruments. As shown by my investigation of China’s coastal 
waters, people are willing to pay for legal rights which guarantee 
exclusive access, regardless of the relatively high cost. The statisti-
cal data further reveals that, when coastal waters are divided, there 
is a negative correlation between fragmentation of the seas and sea-
based production. Therefore, based on the empirical evidence, I am 
reasonably confident that the tragedy of the anticommons is not oc-
curring in China’s coastal waters. 
 
Keywords: natural resources, coastal waters, property law, Chinese 
law, comparative law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two metaphors are often used to describe the polar opposites of 
the allocation of natural resources: “the tragedy of the commons” 
and “the tragedy of the anticommons.” The tragedy of the commons 
describes the destruction that occurs when natural resources are ac-
cessible to all members in a given community.1 Depleted fisheries 
and overgrazed fields are typical examples of this tragedy.2 How-
ever, according to Michael Heller’s oft-cited article, a resource is 
prone to underuse when too many owners hold exclusive rights.3 
                                                                                                             
 1.  In Hardin’s words, “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 AM. ASSOC. ADV. SCIENCE PUB. 1243–
44 (1968). Study on the broad range of commons includes adaptive systems, effi-
ciency, environmental policy, equity, experimental economics, free riding, game 
theory, gender, institutional design principles, new institutional economics, par-
ticipatory management systems, property rights regimes, resilience, regulation, 
sustainability, etc. See the Digital Library of the Commons (DLC), 
https://perma.cc/2WTL-QQYV. 
 2.  Colin W. Clark, Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Spe-
cies, 81 J. POLIT. ECON. 950, 950–61 (1973). 
 3.  Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 621–25 (1998); By 
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The more we divide common resources into small, fenced-off lots, 
Heller argues, the more difficult we make it for people to do busi-
ness and build something.4 It is for this reason that too much own-
ership “wrecks markets, stops innovation, costs lives” and finally 
leads to “the tragedy of the anticommons” or a gridlocked econ-
omy.5 
In some ways, the anticommons are a mirror image of the com-
mons. Property theorists attest to extreme cases of the inefficient use 
of natural resources, claiming that the commons leads to overuse 
and destruction whereas the anticommons leads to underuse and 
waste. Nowadays, the term “anticommons” has become so widely 
used that it flows “easily from the lips and pens of nearly every prop-
erty teacher and scholar.”6 The broad range of anticommons encom-
passes empty Moscow storefronts,7 suboptimal land use,8 undesira-
ble cyberspace,9 weakening biotechnology innovation,10 and under-
developed oyster farming.11 However, aside from the controversial 
usage of this new term in the literature, there is insufficient empirical 
evidence to either confirm or refute the metaphor.12 So, if a com-
mons-like resource is divided into small fragments in accordance 
                                                                                                             
mathematical means, Nobel Laureate James Buchanan proved the first economic 
model of the anticommons in 2000. James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Sym-
metric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1–13 (2000). 
 4.  James Surowiecki, The Permission Problem, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 
11, 2008. 
 5.  MICHAEL A. HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH 
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 2 (Basic 
Books 2008). 
 6.  Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 
908 (2004). 
 7.  Heller, supra note 3. 
 8.  Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz & Ben Depoorter, Duality in Property: 
Commons and Anticommons, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 578, 578–91 (2005). 
 9.  Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anti-
commons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 439–519 (2003). 
 10.  Michael S. Mireles Jr., An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research 
Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 141, 144 (2004). 
 11.  Michael A. Heller, The Rose Theorem?, 18 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 29, 43 
(2006). 
 12.  For example, the influence of the anticommons is highly disputed with 
respect to intellectual property, while Epstein and Kuhlik pointed out that claims 
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with Heller’s assumption, will it lead to coordination breakdown? If 
yes, it may prove that Heller’s hypothesis is true in practice; if not, 
one can question whether this assertion is valid in all situations. 
This article aims to explore the empirical realities of Chinese 
coastal waters and to determine whether fragmented property rights 
will lead to a tragedy of the anticommons. This examination is based 
on two separate but related grounds. First, the property regime of the 
coastal waters exhibits a cumulative scale ranging from commons-
like to private use. As an example of a natural resource with com-
plex and interlinked ecosystems,13 coastal waters accommodate 
many kinds of legal norms and policy instruments. Indeed, it would 
be no exaggeration to say that coastal waters are among the most 
challenging forms of natural resource from the perspective of prop-
erty law. 
Second, the evolution of coastal waters in China sheds light on 
the common-to-private spectrum. In the view of neoclassical eco-
nomics, the transition of the Chinese economy since 1978 has been 
interpreted as a development of a “resources allocation mecha-
nism.”14 To put a new spin on this long-lasting issue, the legal mech-
anisms behind Chinese coastal waters can offer some instructive il-
lustrations of the evolution of property rights. At first glance, coastal 
waters should be regarded as a common resource in the context of 
Chinese law. According to Article 9 of the Constitution of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, coastal waters and other natural resources 
                                                                                                             
of biomedical anticommons were unsupported by empirical data. See Michael A. 
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–701 (1998); Richard A. Epstein 
& Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical Anticommons?, 27 REGULATION 54, 
54–58 (2004). 
 13.  DON HINRICHSEN, COASTAL WATERS OF THE WORLD: TRENDS, THREATS 
AND STRATEGIES 2 (Island Press 1998). 
 14.  Shigeru Ishicawa, Underdevelopment of the Market Economy and the 
Limit of the Economic Liberation, in JAPANESE VIEWS ON ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: DIVERSE PATHS TO THE MARKET 87 (Kenichi Ohno & Izumi 
Ohno eds., Routledge 1998).  
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belong to “the whole people.”15 However, with the development of 
fisheries, the invisible hand of the marketplace pushes coastal waters 
into the realms of private use. As a case in point, many fishermen 
fenced off small sections of the waters to produce seafood and as a 
consequence were able to benefit from the de facto occupation of 
the area. To resolve this situation without having to confer legal title, 
the Property Law of 2007 granted the fishermen in question the ex-
clusive rights to use the coastal waters while the state retains mo-
nopoly ownership.16 Consequently, the legal status of coastal areas 
has been transformed from a commons-like resource into a mixture 
of state and private property. Within the legal context of the coastal 
waters in China, the main actors include the state owner, individual 
users, and local regulators. There are striking similarities in this 
form of legal structure between Moscow storefronts and Chinese 
seawaters. The question then arises as to whether this type of regime 
will lead to underuse. 
In order to arrive at an answer that can be supported by evidence, 
I have spent many years investigating how the coastal water prop-
erty regime has evolved in China. Initially, I distinguished between 
two methods of fishery production, namely aquaculture and capture, 
with the difference between them being essentially the degree of ex-
clusive use. A central requirement of aquaculture is the persistent 
occupation of specific waters. To undertake aquaculture, a “well-
                                                                                                             
 15.  China’s reformers, unlike those in some Eastern Bloc countries, have 
been able to develop more varied and inventive mechanisms. Chinese civil law 
drafters: “seemed to be moving away from the Soviet concept of ‘state owner-
ship,’ i.e. that ‘the state is the sole owner of state property,’ towards the more 
flexible notion of ‘state property’ which ‘belongs to the whole people.’” Edward 
J. Epstein, The Theoretical System of Property Rights in China’s General Princi-
ples of Civil Law: Theoretical Controversy in the Drafting Process and Beyond, 
52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 186 (1989). 
 16.  According to Art. 122 of Wu quan fa [Property Law] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) 
2007 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. (P.R.C.), “the right to the use 
of sea area that is obtained in accordance with law shall be protected by law.” 
Since China’s General Principles of Civil Law in 1986, five kinds of property 
rights have been granted to individuals, but the right to use coastal waters was not 
listed as a property right until the Property Law of 2007. 
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defined, enforceable, transferable, and durable” property right is 
necessary,17 and thus a rights-based regime needs to be created to 
facilitate the continuity of occupation and use of given waters. At 
the same time, capture is normally regulated by simple administra-
tive tools such as permits and licensing. My fieldwork findings con-
firm this. As shown in the interview and questionnaire data, people 
are willing to pay for a legal title, which clearly indicates their ex-
pectation of exclusive access. Furthermore, by collecting data in all 
eleven coastal provinces, I found that aquaculture productivity in 
China is far higher than that of capture, a completely different situ-
ation compared to other parts of the world. Law and economics lit-
erature offers an explanatory account of the imbalance in growth 
between aquaculture and capture production. The property regime 
of aquaculture is an efficiency-increasing institution because it in-
ternalizes potential externalities in commons-like fields. This is con-
sistent with Harold Demsetz’s classic doctrine—the emergence of 
property rights is said to overcome the tragedy of the commons.18 
Demsetz’s doctrine did not indicate whether a property regime 
would, or the extent to which it would, bring about the opposite ef-
fect: where too many rights-holders could block the efficient use of 
a single resource. Fortunately, the empirical reality, established 
from the data collected in China’s coastal waters, has provided a 
striking base from which to explore this potential problem. On 
closer examination, I found that the fragmentation of coastal-water 
holdings has not led to underuse. In order to illustrate this point ac-
curately, I delved deeper into the data on coastal waters which were 
occupied by rights-holders within China’s eleven coastal provinces. 
The statistical data revealed a correlation between the fragmentation 
index and the production index. It highlighted that the smaller the 
                                                                                                             
 17.  Donald Leal, Prologue to EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE 
FISHERIES ix (Donald Leal ed., Rowman & Littlefield 2005) [hereinafter 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES].  
 18.  Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 349 (1967). 
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area designated for farming, the greater the level of production out-
put. In other words, the fragmentation of coastal waters does not 
lead to underuse or a breakdown in fish production. To summarize, 
based on the empirical evidence, I am reasonably confident that the 
tragedy of the anticommons is not occurring in China’s coastal wa-
ters. 
The article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview of 
the common-to-private spectrum in natural resources. From a theo-
retical standpoint, I argue that Heller’s dynamic analytics puts for-
ward an incomplete explanation of the evolution of property rights. 
Part III introduces the historical background to the transition from 
commons-like resources into private property. China’s wait-and-see 
process indicates that the change of utility would lead to a demand 
for exclusive-use rights. Part IV empirically explores two sequential 
questions. First, will the fragmented waters lead to a tragedy of the 
anticommons in accordance with Heller’s hypothesis? And second, 
if not, why will this not occur? The answer lies in the fact that state 
owners and individual rights-holders can interact and coordinate 
with each other, and the market-driven system can prevent any grid-
lock. Part V will close with a brief conclusion. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: SPECTRUM OR RUBIK’S 
CUBE? 
From the perspective of property law, debates on natural re-
sources “can move beyond polarizing oppositions that have made 
jurisprudential debates unsolvable and rendered concrete problems 
invisible” by dynamic analytics.19 To date, much has been written 
about the evolution of property rights over natural resources, even 
                                                                                                             
 19.  Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 79, 79 (2001). Actually, contrary to the Blackstonian tradi-
tion in common law, which regards natural resources law as a subset of property 
law, issues relating to the use and control of natural resources are often treated as 
administrative law problems rather than as property law problems in many juris-
dictions. See Robert L. Fishman, What is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 717 (2007). 
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though it is often unclear what is expected to evolve.20 Following 
Harold Demsetz’s classic hypothesis, which is still widely cited, the 
emergence of property rights is said to internalize potential external-
ities and thus the “tragedy of the commons” under the open-access 
regime could be eliminated.21 Therefore, the term the “tragedy of 
the commons” has gradually become one of the starting points for 
questioning the emergence of property rights over natural resources. 
Conversely, in what Heller has termed the “tragedy of the anticom-
mons,” the inefficient use of a specified piece of property will arise 
when “multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude 
others from a scarce source, and no one has an effective privilege of 
use. When too many owners hold such rights of exclusion, the re-
sources are prone to underuse . . .”22 
The symmetrical tragedies of the commons and anticommons 
have set a framework for a wide range of social, economic, and legal 
issues. Along these lines, the current broad classification of catego-
ries of property in natural resources needs to be modified. The stand-
ard property trilogy of private, commons, and state seems outdated. 
In light of Heller’s dynamic analytics, the evolution of property 
could be delineated as a common-to-private spectrum23: 
                                                                                                             
 20.  Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for De-
lineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002). There are, however, 
few theoretical works on the evolution of rights to natural resources by legal aca-
demics, while economists are much more interested in this area. 
 21.  Demsetz, supra note 18. 
 22.  Heller, supra note 3, at 622.  
 23.  Michael A. Heller, Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE. L. J. 
1163, 1167 (1999); see generally Heller, supra note 19. 
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Figure 1. The Spectrum of Property Regime in Heller’s Dynamic 
Analytics 
As Benjamin Cardozo wrote, “[m]etaphors in law are to be nar-
rowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end 
often by enslaving it.”24 No matter how popular the use of the anti-
commons metaphor may appear to be, it is evident that it is poorly 
suited to the task of explaining the property regime in the real world. 
Indeed, the evolution of the resource system cannot be portrayed as 
a one-dimensional spectrum moving from one extreme to the other. 
First, there is insufficient empirical evidence to confirm Heller’s 
dynamic analytics in the field of natural resources. Across a broad 
range of contemporary scholarship on the subject of property, two 
approaches dominate the discussions: utilitarian theory and liberal 
contractarian theory.25 Building on the work of Ronald Coase, Dem-
setz argues that the legal rule of resources follows the path that pro-
duces net benefits for the relevant community.26 Yet some utilitarian 
theorists, such as Heller, are so concentrated on the “cost–benefit 
equation” that they usually, or often, ignore other factors that will 
generate the evolution of property rights over natural resources. 
More broadly, we might observe that custom and culture have 
played an under-analyzed but vital role in the allocation of natural 
resources. For instance, historical examples in areas such as mining 
                                                                                                             
 24.  Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 24 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). 
 25.  PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY xviii (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. 
Peñalver eds., Oxford University Press 2010).  
 26.  Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property RightsⅡ: The Competi-
tion Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 653 (2002). 
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and whaling rules serve to illustrate that property law sometimes re-
lies on community custom.27 Similarly, traditional custom still holds 
the de facto influence when allocating natural resources in China’s 
remote countryside.28 Increasingly, empirical experience shows that 
historical tradition, cultural differences, distributional preference, 
and other factors combine to have an effect on the evolution of prop-
erty rights over natural resources.29 By regarding such a challenging 
subject as being “commons without tragedy”30 or the “comedy of 
the commons,”31 we must recognize that the theory underlying com-
mons and anticommons often fails to square with reality. 
Second, Heller’s dynamic analytics puts forward an incomplete 
explanation for the evolution of property rights. According to Hel-
ler’s argument, there is the existence of a theoretical precondition 
that high transaction costs or potential hold-out problems will lead 
to “market failure” due to the lack of outsider authority. Conversely, 
Richard Epstein holds that government ownership and regulation of-
ten create far more gridlock than private property, and therefore he 
believes that there is not too much private property but, rather, too 
little.32 Personally, I take both of these two opposing views with a 
                                                                                                             
 27.  Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 5, 24–34 (2002). 
 28.  For instance, Mongolians still rely on some ancient rules to allocate and 
use natural resources such as the habit of “rotation grazing.” See Bing Mei et al., 
Gu Dai Meng Gu Zu Zi Ran Zi Yuan Bao Hu Fa Lv Ji Qi Shi [The Enlightenment 
of Natural Resources Protection Law of the Ancient Mongols to Protect the Envi-
ronment Nowadays], 36 LAN ZHOU DA XUE XUE BAO (J. LANZHOU U.) 100, 100–
04 (2008) (Ch.). 
 29.  As Gregory Alexander writes, “culture is all but missing from de Soto’s 
explanation for the rise of capitalism in the developed world.” Gregory S. Alex-
ander, Culture and Capitalism: A Comment on de Soto, in HERNANDO DE SOTO 
AND PROPERTY IN A MARKET ECONOMY 41 (D. Benjamin Barros ed., Ashgate 
2010).  
 30.  Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35 (Kenneth 
Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., Edward Elgar 2011). 
 31.  Carol Rose proposed the term “comedy of the commons” to illustrate 
that enforcing private-property rights was costly. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of 
the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 711, 711–81 (1986). 
 32.  Richard A. Epstein, Heller’s Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why 
There is Too Little, Not Too Much Private Property, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 82 (2011). 
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grain of salt. In a world without the friction caused by transaction 
costs,33 either private use or common use leads to efficiency. How-
ever, in a less than ideal world where a particular resource is used 
by multiple actors, the optimum regime established under the re-
striction of transactional barriers will vary from location to location. 
Therefore, the efficiency of property rights arrangements is situa-
tion-specific and Heller’s hypothesis does not explain the whole 
story of resource regimes. To give one example, in Papua New 
Guinea, many land areas have been returned to communal owner-
ship because the concept of private land ownership has not been well 
integrated into the local culture.34 In contrast to the dogmatic dichot-
omy of commons and private property, these two seemingly contra-
dictory models are always integrated and coordinated as a solution 
to high transaction costs in the real world.35 Therefore, neither com-
mon nor private property provides a one-size-fits-all solution to the 
allocation of natural resources. 
Third, given the conceptual gap between the common-law and 
civil-law systems, I am skeptical about whether Heller’s hypothesis 
leaves enough room to interpret the property law of other jurisdic-
tions. The implication of property rights in common law is different 
to that held within civil law. As any first-year law student knows, 
the common law has savaged the idea of “absolute” ownership and 
                                                                                                             
 33.  It is worth pointing out that Fennell broadened the meaning of transac-
tion costs. She proposed the term “resource access costs” to designate the full 
range of costs. See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1477 (2013). 
 34.  THOMAS STERNER & JESSICA CORIA, POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 47 (2d ed., RFF Press 
2011).  
 35.  Using a recent example, the failure of many traditional regulation struc-
tures has led economists to propose several property rights-based approaches, in-
cluding Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs or ITQs), which allocate units of harvest, 
and Territorial User Rights Fisheries (TURFs), which allocate units of space to 
private firms, cooperatives, or fishermen. Christopher Costello & Daniel T. Kaf-
fine, Marine Protected Areas in Spatial Property-Rights Fisheries, 54 AUSTL. J. 
AGRIC. RES. ECON. 321, 321–41 (2010). 
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tended to view property as a “bundle of rights.”36 In contrast, as can 
be traced back to the concept of dominium in Roman law, civil law 
jurisdictions still hold the timeless and “absolute” notion of owner-
ship and there is no such thing as “relative” ownership.37 For exam-
ple, by subdividing property rights into right in rem and in perso-
nam, leases were originally viewed as only creating a contractual 
relationship in civil law. Underlying the principle is a denial of the 
unity of ownership. However, English law created the concept of 
tenure and thus ownership could apparently be divided between 
landlord and tenant.38 As a result, with no “absolute ownership 
right,” the “bundle of rights” in common law can strengthen flexi-
bility in the use of natural resources, although it is likely to increase 
the possibility of the disintegration of property, as the greater num-
ber of rights of exclusion that exist, the more likely it is that anti-
commons will occur (or vice versa). So far, little evidence has been 
offered to support the argument that the fragmentation of property 
rights would lead to the underuse of natural resources in civil law 
jurisdictions. 
To summarize, despite its growing influence, Heller’s insight 
leaves more questions open than it answers. Unlike the flow of one-
way traffic, where all resources routinely move from open-access to 
exclusive-access, a property regime of natural resources is always 
(or perhaps typically) a mixture of many seemingly contradictory 
mechanisms. Therefore, taking into account the diversified re-
sources system in the real world, I prefer to regard the evolution of 
                                                                                                             
 36.  Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in 
Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015 (2008); see also James E. Penner, The 
Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996). 
 37.  After the new Dutch Civil Code of 1992, civil law jurisdictions are 
slowly moving toward to the notion of “relative” ownership. See Willem J. 
Zwalve, Temporary and Conditional Ownership: Some Observations on Modern 
Dutch Property Law, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY 333-45 (Gerrit van Maanen & André van der Walt eds., Maklu 
Utitgevers 1996).  
 38.  Kevin Gray, Property in Common Law Systems, in PROPERTY LAW ON 
THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 37 at 236–245; see also JESSE 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 421-28 (7th ed., Aspen Publishers 2010).  
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property rights as being a Rubik’s Cube rather than a one-dimen-
sional spectrum. 
III. THE TRANSITION OF COASTAL WATERS IN CHINA 
A. Characteristics of Coastal Waters 
The oceans were the last commons.39 According to the tradition 
of ancient Rome, immovable property was confined to land and its 
attachment thereto. Historically, the sea has been excluded from the 
list of property and treated as the commons because of three charac-
teristics: 
Abundance—Viewed from the perspective of natural law, the 
sea has usually been regarded as an inexhaustible treasure. In Ro-
man law, the sea was res communis, which suggests that it was com-
mon property and unsusceptible to private ownership.40 If rights 
were violated when using the sea area, a penalty would be imposed 
as actio iniurarium.41 In 1609, Hugo Grotius argued that the sea be-
longed to no one and therefore no state could claim sovereignty over 
it.42 This concept, with its strong philosophical and rhetorical roots, 
was generally accepted.43 Nevertheless, the debate was irrelevant 
from the view of property law. As a form of natural resource without 
scarcity, the sea (in the same way as sunshine or air) has neither 
                                                                                                             
 39.  Rögnvaldur Hannesson, The Privatization of the Oceans, in PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 17, at 25. 
 40.  Samuel C. Wiel, Running Water, 22 HARV. L. REV. 190, 190–215 
(1909). Generally speaking, if the seas were res communis, they were free to be 
used by all; if the seas were res nullius, they were the property of no one. See 
DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY-ORIENTED INQUIRIES (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1987). 
 41.  Christin Gowar & C. J. Visser, Actio Iniuriarum–One Action, But Only 
One Iniuria? Le Roux v. Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC), 76 JOURNAL OF 
COMTEMPORARY ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 490, 490–98 (2013). 
 42.  HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (Ralph van Deman Magof-
fin trans., Oxford University Press 1916) (1609). 
 43.  At the same time, an opposite view was taken by a particularly Scottish 
school of thought, which accorded propriety interests in the coastal waters to the 
coastal states. See RICHARD BARNES, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES 173 (Bloomsbury Publishing 2009).  
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economic utility nor legal value. For this reason, the sea area has not 
been mentioned by legislators in either the French Civil Code or the 
German Civil Code. 
Fluidity—Because of its mobility and fluidity, an exclusion 
strategy is difficult in the case of water.44 In the civil law context, 
only those physical things that can be possessed exclusively would 
be classified as property (right in rem). Although property rights 
may be exercised with respect to “any valuable object of any con-
ceivable kind”45 in common law, only “tangible, unique and easily 
identifiable”46 things can be treated as property. Due to its physically 
fluid nature, it appears that the permanent physical occupation of 
coastal waters would be “mission impossible.” In essence, it is dif-
ficult to define the ownership of waters in geographical terms, mak-
ing it hard for legislators to place them on the list of movable or 
immovable property. 
Publicity—Under classical liberal theory, which divides the pub-
lic and private spheres, property rights have been placed entirely 
within the private sphere.47 As a public trust resource, coastal waters 
serve the public—they are recognized to that end, and property 
rights are limited due to the nature of coastal waters as a public re-
source.48 For example, if waters are navigable in the United States, 
all state-created property rights and private interests in these waters 
are subordinate to this overriding principle of navigation.49 There-
fore, providing an account of the public function of the seas is vital50 
                                                                                                             
 44.  Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property 
Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (2008). 
 45.  A. Irving Hallowell, Nature and Function of Property as a Social Insti-
tution, 1 J. LEGAL & POL. SOC. 115, 128 (1942). 
 46.  Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition 
of Property: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 605 (1994). 
 47.  BARNES, supra note 43, at 63. 
 48.  State v. Shack 277 A 2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971). 
 49.  See Joseph J. Kalo, Introduction to ALISON RIESER, DONNA R. CHRISTIE, 
JOSEPH J. KALO & RICHARD G. HILDRETH, COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1–3 (Thomson West 2007).  
 50.  Id. According to the United States Congress, “the federal government 
had a direct responsibility for navigation and commerce in coastal waters and a 
shared interest in conservation and economic developments in coastal areas.”  
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and, as a result, coastal waters are not used in the same way as other 
resources. 
B. Historical Background to the Transition 
Broadly speaking, there are two threads running through the 
evolution of the resource regime in China: political power and pri-
vate rights. For most of China’s long history, the conception of prop-
erty has been different from the distinction drawn in Western law, 
as in Roman law, between imperium and dominium,51 or political 
power and private rights.52 With rare exceptions, property in natural 
resources has been primarily viewed as a tool of political power in 
Chinese history. Therefore, it has been a long-standing source of 
controversy among modern scholars as to whether private law ex-
isted in the ancient period.53 
With the advent of Communist rule in 1949, ideological and in-
stitutional changes brought about profound amendments to codified 
laws. At variance with the survival-oriented peasant in traditional 
China and the capitalism of the West, China pursued a planned econ-
omy in accordance with Marxist–Leninist theory. According to Ar-
ticle 9 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, “all 
mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, wasteland, 
beaches and other natural resources are owned by the state, that is, 
by the whole people, with the exception of the forests, mountains, 
grasslands, wastelands and beaches that are owned by collectives in 
                                                                                                             
 51.  Geoffrey Samuel, The Many Dimensions of Property, in PROPERTY AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 40-45 (Janet Mclean ed., Hart Publishing 1999); See also 
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 13 (1927). As 
M. R. Cohen noted, in contrast, “we must not overlook the actual fact that domin-
ium over things is also imperium over our fellow human beings.”  
 52.  A famous phrase in the Book of Songs (shi jing), the first collection of 
poems in China, created in the 11th Century BC, states that “all the lands belong 
to the emperor.” Translated from the ancient Chinese phrase “pu tian zhi xia, mo 
fei wang tu.” 
 53.  For a summary of these arguments, see Yu Jiang, guan yu Zhong guo gu 
dai you wu min fa wen ti de zai si kao [Rethink Over the Question of Whether 
There was Private Law in Ancient China or Not], 6 XIAN DAI FA XUE (J. MODERN 
L. STUD.) 35, 35–45 (2001). 
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accordance with the law.” Obviously, all natural resources, includ-
ing coastal waters, are therefore officially labeled as state property. 
However, in light of the economic reforms and opening-up policies 
that have been introduced since 1978, the concept of state property, 
which originated as a transplanted legal term, has steadily evolved 
into a Chinese-style institution serving social goals.54 On the one 
hand, being state property, natural resource rights in China may not 
be transferred due to the rule of exclusivity, described as “inaliena-
bility entitlement” by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed.55 
On the other hand, natural resources such as land, mines, and waters 
will be pushed into the marketplace with regard to their allocation, 
use, and transfer. Therefore, new types of property rights have to be 
created to resolve this paradoxical system.56 China’s reformers are 
trying to steer a middle course between protecting individual rights-
holders, who are “entitled to possess, use and seek proceeds from it 
in accordance with the law,” and upholding state ownership in ac-
cordance with the Constitution.57 
C. The Three Stages of the Transition 
Should legislators consider the coastal waters to be immovable 
property? This is a controversial issue that has attracted nationwide 
attention to the legislative process on property law in China.58 The 
                                                                                                             
 54.  Bing Shui, Zi Ran Zi Yuan Guo Jia Suo You Quan Shuang Jie Gou Zao 
Shuo [Double-level Structure of State Ownership of Natural Resources], 35 FA 
XUE YAN JIU (CHINESE J. L.) 4, 4–18 (2013). 
 55.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 
(1972). 
 56.  For example, many private rights embody the right to contracted man-
agement of land, the right to use construction land, the right to use house sites, the 
right to use seawaters, the mineral prospecting right, the mining right, the water 
intake right, and the right to use water areas or tidal flats for farming or fishery, 
etc. See Wu quan fa (2007) (P.R.C.), supra note 16, Art. 122–24, 135, 152. 
 57.  Id. at Art. 117. 
 58.  The Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Congress solicited opinions over 
Property Law (Draft) in 2005. The most heated dispute centered on whether and 
how to define the right to use the sea area, with 11, 543 pieces of feedback sought 
nationwide. 
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logic behind this debate rests in the fact that the physical and eco-
nomic features of coastal waters have changed at an unprecedented 
rate. 
When it comes to the characteristic of abundance, coastal waters 
are becoming a scarce resource in the course of China’s economic 
development. China has an expansive sea area, with a continental 
coastline of over 18,000 km, and an island coastline of over 14,000 
km.59 Coastal regions support over 40 percent60 of the national pop-
ulation and over 60 percent61 of GDP, while accounting for only 13.5 
percent62 of the total national land area. Legislators and the general 
public alike have realized that the nearshore sea area not only sup-
plies important natural resources, but also constitutes a major prop-
erty category. Therefore, the present demand on coastal resources is 
high.  
As for the characteristic of fluidity, coastal waters can be parti-
tioned by latitude and longitude using technological means, which 
accordingly makes geographical occupation possible. In traditional 
civil law, coastal waters are not deemed to be an object to which real 
rights can be attached due to their social and economic limitations; 
without a recognizable boundary, waters are unlikely to be exclu-
sively accessed. However, with the development of modern technol-
ogy and devices, a Global Positioning System (GPS) can easily dis-
tinguish demarcated sea areas. Furthermore, the term coastal waters 
not only refer to mobile and fluid water, but also embraces a three-
dimensional space consisting of sea surface, seawater, seabed, and 
                                                                                                             
 59.  Marine Physical Geography, 2013 Zhongguo hai yang tong ji nian jian 
35 (2013 Marine Statistical Y. B. China) (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guo jia 
hai yang ju [State Oceanic Administration P.R.C.]). 
 60.  Population at Year-end by Region, 2014 Zhongguo tong ji nian jian 28 
[2014 Statistical Y. B. China] (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guo jia tong ji ju 
[National Bureau of Statistics P.R.C.]).  
 61.  Id. at 221–22. 
 62.  Id. at 211, 234. 
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sediment.63 When viewed from this perspective, coastal areas could 
arguably be considered as immovable property. 
In terms of publicity, this hardly poses an obstacle for public ac-
cess because coastal waters belong to the state in China. More spe-
cifically, China’s coastal waters are a mixture of state ownership and 
private property. State ownership is inalienable, while individuals 
can be granted the right to occupy, use, and withdraw specified 
coastal waters. This unique system, although imperfect, duly bal-
ances the potential conflict of public access and private use in 
China’s coastal waters. 
From the social point of view, what has occurred in China’s 
coastal waters is an under-theorized “trial and error” process,64 
which can be divided into three stages: 
The open-access stage (1950–1977)—this refers to the period 
when everyone could freely use the natural resources. Under this 
commons-like regime, every individual had the opportunity to be a 
free rider65 because they obtained the resources free of charge. 
The limited-access stage (1978–2006)—referring to the period 
when collective members were granted contractual rights to use 
coastal waters and other natural resources by the Family Contract 
Farming System (Bao Chan Dao Hu). Under this regime, some col-
lective members were granted contractual rights rather than property 
rights (right in rem) to use and withdraw the waters, but they did not 
retain the right against the collective and other third parties. Despite 
                                                                                                             
 63.  According to Art. 2 of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo hai yu shi yong 
guan li fa [The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of 
the Use of Sea Areas] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Oct. 27, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002) 2002 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. 
Gaz. (P.R.C.), “sea area refers to internal waters, water surface, water body, sea-
bed and sediment of territorial waters in the territory of the People’s Republic of 
China.” 
 64.  For a brief introduction to this process, see Frank Xianfeng Huang, The 
Path to Clarify: Development of Property Rights in China, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN 
L. 191 (2003). 
 65.  Theodore Groves and John Ledyard, Optimal Allocation of Public 
Goods: A Solution to the “Free Rider” Problem, 45 ECONOMETRICA: J. OF THE 
ECONOMETRIC SOC. 783, 809 (1977). 
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the lack of stability and transferability,66 the contractual instruments 
acted as a “compromise between formalism and pragmatism”67 and 
succeeded in decreasing the number of free riders in the waters. 
The exclusive-access stage (2007–2015)—this describes the pe-
riod since the application of the Property Law (Wu Quan Fa). 
Broadly speaking, the exclusive-access stage could be argued to date 
back to 2001 when the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Administration of Sea Areas (Hai Yu Guan Li Fa) was introduced 
to legally protect “any exclusive continuous use of seas within spe-
cific sea areas.”68 However, this declaration functions only at the 
level of administrative law, and the right to use coastal waters was 
not treated as a property right until the execution of the Property 
Law in 2007. By entitling individuals to exclusively occupy, use, 
and withdraw the coastal waters, the Property Law has deprived the 
collective or state of the right to terminate the contract at will. In 
other words, under this rights-based regime, an individual’s right to 
exclusively use the waters was informally framed as a property 
right.69 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 66.  Based on a 1997 study, 66 percent of contracts had been adjusted by the 
collective more than once. See Peter Ho, Who Owns China’s Land? Policies, 
Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity?, 166 CHINA QUARTERLY 
397 (2001). 
 67.  Huang, supra note 64, at 221. 
 68.  According to its definition, “[t]his law shall be applicable to any exclu-
sive continuous use of the seas within specific sea areas of the interior waters or 
territorial seas for three months or longer.” See hai yu shi yong guan li fa (2002) 
(P.R.C.), supra note 63, Art. 2. 
 69.  According to Art. 120 of Wu quan fa (2007) (P.R.C.), supra note 16, “the 
owner shall not interfere with the exercise of rights by the usufructuary” other-
wise, according to Art. 37, individuals “may request compensation for the dam-
ages and may also request the infringing party to assume other civil liabilities.” In 
other words, as a usufruct, the right to exclusively use waters includes the possi-
bility to oppose the state. 
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IV. THE EMPIRICAL REALITY OF COASTAL WATERS IN CHINA 
A. Does the Property Regime Lead to Anticommons? 
As previously noted, I regard the adoption of the Property Law 
in 2007 as the starting point for the exclusive-access stage. This is 
because the right to use waters, namely the “exclusive continuous 
use of seas within specific sea areas,”70 has been informally treated 
as a property right by law. Under the property-right regime, the 
coastal waters have been fragmented into numerous small, fenced-
off areas that individuals can use exclusively. This change raises two 
separate but related questions: Is the property-rights regime more 
efficient than ever? And, if yes, will too much fragmentation lead to 
underuse in accordance with Heller’s dynamic analytics? 
1. The Bottom-Up Model Versus the Top-Down Model 
Much has been written, particularly in the literature on law and 
economics, about policy instruments for fisheries and waters. Yet 
much of the literature has been clouded by the confusion that stems 
from the difference between (1) “water right” and “right to use wa-
ters,” and (2) “right to aquaculture” and “right to capture.” A water 
right entitles the rights-holder to capture and convey water, whereas 
the “right to use water” means that the rights-holder can continu-
ously use the specified waters. The term “water right” does not con-
cern fisheries.71 Yet fisheries revolve around two distinct methods 
of production in the economic literature. One is aquaculture, which 
requires the persistent occupation of the given waters, and the other, 
much more prevalent and older than aquaculture, is capture, which 
does not normally require persistent occupation. Further, it can be 
hypothesized that strong property rights are necessary for intensive 
aquaculture to thrive or, rather, that intensive aquaculture finds it 
hard to exist under weak property rights. 
                                                                                                             
 70.  Hai yu shi yong guan li fa (2002) (P. R. C.), supra note 63, at Art. 2. 
 71.  Here, I disregard the complicated situation whereby rights-holders not 
only use the waters to produce seafood, but also to convey the water elsewhere. 
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Clarification of this sort is helpful when studying the way in 
which the property-rights regime influences fishery productivity. 
When compared with capture production, primarily based on Rich-
ard Epstein’s terms, I advocate that aquaculture should be handled 
as a bottom-up model because it aims to grant users the right to ex-
clusive occupation.72 Conversely, I suggest that capture production 
should be categorized as a top-down model because it is regulated 
by such administrative tools as licensing and permits. To summarize, 
it is the bottom-up model which exemplifies the property-rights re-
gime. 
For the purposes of comparison, an overview of global fisheries 
reveals the imbalance between capture and aquaculture production. 
As Figure 2 shows, the level of aquaculture production in China is 
far higher than that of capture production, which is quite different 
from anywhere else in the world. Even though global aquaculture 
production has been on the rise for a long time, it is still nearly equal 
to capture production at the global level. A very distinctive picture 
emerges in China, where aquaculture production began to increase 
in 1978, marking the starting point of the Limited-access stage 
(1978‒2006). At the present time, China’s capture production is sig-
nificantly lagging behind aquaculture production (at around one-
third of the level). These facts alone suggest that there is a huge im-
balance between aquaculture and capture production. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 72.  Both the top-down and the bottom-up system are well illustrated by Rich-
ard Epstein in his analysis of the allocation of parking spaces on public roads. 
Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 515 (2002). 
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Figure 2. Capture Production & Aquaculture Production (1950–
2013)73 
 
 
In addition, this imbalance between capture and aquaculture pro-
duction indicates that the bottom-up model is more efficient than the 
top-down model. Figure 3 shows the data on Chinese coastal waters 
in more concrete terms. As noted, the top-down model represents 
capture production while the bottom-up model represents aquacul-
ture production. Obviously, the curve of the bottom-up model rises 
more steeply. All things being equal, we would expect a tendency 
for aquaculture output to be far ahead of capture output. It is also 
worth pointing out that the year in which bottom-up production ex-
ceeded top-down for the first time coincided with the starting point 
of the exclusive-access stage (2007–2015). 
 
                                                                                                             
 73.  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], Fish-
eries & Aquaculture Department, Statistics, Global Capture Production & Global 
Aquaculture Production, https://perma.cc/EB9P-HDRC; https://perma.cc/SC36-
NVXX. 
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Figure 3. Two Models of Fisheries in Chinese Coastal Waters 
 
Finally, it is possible to test the null hypothesis by means of 
SPSS analysis: that the three access stages will affect the models 
equally. I used a one-way, between-group ANOVA (analysis of var-
iance) to analyze the data. Tukey’s post-hoc comparisons were used 
to examine the differences between the models (p < .01). Each ac-
cess stage affected the degree of production that the bottom-up 
model would bring about, F (2, 61) = 85.14, p < .01, η2 = .74. The 
exclusive-access stage would result in more production (M = 
48311416.71, SD = 5843405.88, n = 7) than both the open-access 
stage (M = 987709.54, SD = 600227.89) and the limited-access 
stage (M = 15965825.52, SD = 12608218.91).74 Consequently, we 
can reject the null hypothesis. 
                                                                                                             
 74.  To construct and analyze the figure, I used SPSS and reported the find-
ings in accordance with APA style guidelines. See ADELHEID A. M. NICOL & 
PENNY M. PEXMAN, DISPLAYING YOUR FINDINGS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
CREATING FIGURES, POSTERS, AND PRESENTATIONS 12 (6th ed., American Psy-
chological Association 2010). 
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As the data are statistically significant, we can conclude that the 
bottom-up model is more efficient than its counterpart model within 
Chinese coastal waters. 
2. Data and Findings 
The Chinese example also casts an interesting light on the ques-
tion of whether the fragmented rights would lead to a tragedy of the 
anticommons. According to recent data, a total of 6,499,882.37 hec-
tares of sea area have been allocated for exclusive use. The certifi-
cates of rights to use coastal waters amount to 191,524 and every 
certificate signifies an exclusive section of coastal waters. Mathe-
matically, this indicates that the mean area of exclusive use is 33.93 
hectares per certificate. I refer to this as the fragmentation index (FI) 
of coastal waters. In 2012, the total area reserved for aquaculture 
amounted to 2,180,927 hectares, which yielded a production total of 
16,438,105 tons. Therefore, the mean output of aquaculture was 
7.537 tons per hectare. I refer to this as the production index (PI) to 
formalize the discussion. 
I collected fragmentation index and production index data from 
all eleven coastal provinces in China. The data was derived primar-
ily from three sources: (1) the China Ocean Yearbook;75 (2) the 
China Marine Statistical Yearbook;76 and（3）the China Statistical 
Yearbook.77 Table 1 lists a breakdown of this information during the 
period from 2002 to 2012. I will utilize this dataset to explore the 
relationship between fragmentation and production. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 75.  Zhongguo hai yang nian jian [Ocean Y. B. China] (Zhongguo hai yang 
nian jian bian zuan wei yuan hui [Ocean Y. B. China Compilation Comm.]). 
 76.  Zhongguo hai yang tong ji nian jian [Marine Statistical Y. B. China] 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guo jia hai yang ju [State Oceanic Administration 
P.R.C.]). 
 77.  Zhongguo tong ji nian jian [Statistical Y. B. China] (Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo guo jia tong ji ju [National Bureau of Statistics P.R.C.]). 
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Table 1. Fragmentation Index (FI) and Production Index (PI) in All Eleven Coastal Provinces in China 
 2002 
FI / PI 
2003 
FI / PI 
2004 
FI / PI 
2005 
FI / PI 
2006 
FI / PI 
2007 
FI / PI 
2008 
FI / PI 
2009 
FI / PI 
2010 
FI / PI 
2011 
FI / PI 
2012 
FI / PI 
Shandong 37.4/11.1 33.4/9.4 47.1/8.8 31.5/8.8 30/8.9 31.5/8.7 62.1/8.5 73.4/8.6 58.6/7.9 54/8 160.3/8.3 
Jiangsu 289.4/2.4 208.5/2.6 137.5/2.9 173.7/3.1 190/3.4 180.3/4.2 ----- 143.7/4.3 173.4/4.1 150.4/4.2 152.5/4.5 
Fujian 14.2/20.5 16.1/20.6 9.3/20.3 13.1/20.3 11.8/20.5 13.8/24.9 7.5/23.5 4/21.9 26.9/22 20.7/22.2 27.1/22.9 
Hebei 31.6/2.4 33.6/2.9 30.1/3.2 23.8/3.4 17.8/2.7 26.7/3.2 13.7/3.2 41.8/2.7 90/2.5 14.3/2.8 60/2.8 
Hainan 12.4/7.9 7/8.9 8.8/9 8/10.5 6.9/11.2 6.1/19 1.1/13.5 2/13 14.6/12.7 16.8/13 25.7/13.6 
Shanghai 90.5/3.5 202.8/5.9 ---- 202.8/7.4 110.3/5.2 555.4/2.7 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Liaoning 49.4/6.4 49/4.8 26.1/4.8 36.5/4.7 32/4.6 33/6.3 63.3/4.9 102.7/4.6 168.5/3 215.1/3.2 255.7/3.2 
Guangdong 29.2/9.1 21.8/9.1 21.9/9.5 26.2/10 23.3/10.3 23.3/14 176.6/11.8 21.1/12 18.4/12.5 22/13 27.3/13.7 
Zhejiang 14.1/7.3 17.9/7.8 49.9/7.9 24.5/7.8 24.4/8.1 30.1/15.2 39.4/8.7 34.3/9 22.2/8.8 54.4/9.3 21.8/9.6 
Guangxi 2.7/13 3/13.4 4.8/13.8 3/14.4 2.8/14.5 5.7/16.2 9.2/20.6 14/22.2 10.3/17.1 14.9/17.7 9.4/18.4 
Tianjin 48.4/1.4 287.6/1.7 18.2/2 26.3/2.3 27/3 68.8/2 41.3/3.2 65.2/3.3 42.2/3.6 42.9/3.2 21.8/3.6 
FI = total entitled areas / number of rights-holders; PI = total production / total entitled areas 
 
What does the data tell us? Regression analysis can help to test the 
hypothesis of whether the fragmented waters would lead to the an-
ticommons. If Heller’s hypothesis is assumed to be true, we might 
infer that when the scale of fragmentation increases, productivity 
will decrease. Or, to put it another way, the more we divide natural 
resources into small units, the greater the level of waste and un-
deruse that will occur. To prove this assertion, there should be a pos-
itive correlation between the fragmentation index and the production 
index. 
I analyzed the potential correlation between fragmentation and 
production by using Pearson’s r.78 Two variables correlated at r (112) 
= .44, p < .001, r² = .193. The fragmentation figure ranged from 1.12 to 
555.4 (M = 59.50, SD = 80.67, n = 114). The production figure seen 
                                                                                                             
 78.  NICOL & PEXMAN, supra note 74. 
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on a regular basis ranged from 1.37 to 24.92 (M = 9.149, SD = 6.20, 
n = 114). 
 
Figure 4. Simple Linear Regression of FI and PI79 
 
As Figure 4 shows, I took production as the dependent variable 
and fragmentation as the independent variable. To improve the ho-
mogeneity of variance, I used a variance-stabilizing transformation. 
Linear regression analysis allowed me to predict PI (production in-
dex) from FI (fragmentation index), F (1,112) = 64.42, p < .001, 
with a slope of −.37 and a Y-intercept of 3.25. The fragmentation 
variable significantly predicted production (p < .001). When predict-
ing production from fragmentation, I erred by 0.59 production rating 
points (Standard Error of the Estimate = .59). 
Here, potential objections might be raised because I had not 
taken into consideration the possibility that other factors could affect 
the PI. For example, people might express doubts about whether 
lower productivity is caused by the level of economic development 
                                                                                                             
 79.  All data in the model have been remedied by a variance-stabilizing log-
arithmic transformation. 
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rather than by the degree of fragmentation.80 In order to increase the 
power of the statistics, I calculated and added the value of per capita 
GDP in the eleven coastal provinces because this variable can rep-
resent the level of economic development.81 I then used GDP as a 
covariate to conduct an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA).82 Ac-
cording to the result shown in Table 2, the FI and the PI still tend to 
be strongly correlated (p < .001) even when controlling for GDP. 
This result further supported my findings. 
 
Table 2. Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.223 .170  18.948 .000 2.886 3.560 
GDP .032 .035 .076 .903 .369 −.038 .101 
FI −.394 .052 −.639 −7.558 .000 −.498 −.291 
a. Dependent Variable: PI 
 
Taken as a whole, the statistical data show that the hypothesis is 
not true. There is a moderate correlation between fragmentation and 
production, but it is negative rather than positive. As a result, we can 
reject the hypothesis that high levels of fragmentation would lead to 
low production levels. We might then conclude, from an empirical 
                                                                                                             
 80.  Economists have found that other factors such as geography, climate, and 
resource abundance might affect the productivity of natural resources. For in-
stance, a study has shown evidence of a “curse of natural resources”: countries 
with great natural resources tend to grow more slowly than resource-poor coun-
tries, see Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, The Curse of Natural Resources, 
31 EURO. ECON. Rev. 827, 827–838 (2001). 
 81.  Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 425 
Q. J. ECON. 407, 433 (1991). 
 82.  Covariate refers to a variable used in ANCOVA to statistically control 
for variance, which might be obscuring the effects of an independent variable. 
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standpoint, that there is no tragedy of the anticommons in China’s 
coastal waters. Conversely, the more fragmented the areas, the 
higher the productivity. This, to a large extent, implies that there is 
a “comedy of the anticommons” in China’s coastal waters. There-
fore, based on the empirical evidence, my conclusion is the opposite 
of Heller’s assumed theory. 
B. Why a Gridlock Will Not Occur 
Why does the anticommons hypothesis fail in practice? As I ar-
gued in part II of this article, Heller’s theory incompletely (or im-
perfectly) interprets the complexity of the real world. At the very 
least, he makes no reference to circumstances where state ownership 
and private property are always integrated and coordinated as a so-
lution to overcome gridlock.83 The anticommons hypothesis as-
sumes that too many rights lead to a potential hold-out problem or a 
breakdown in cooperation. However, this is not always true; some-
times players choose to cooperate with each other because they are 
aware that a non-cooperative strategy is not the best course of action. 
By way of illustration, we should consider the actual practice in 
China’s coastal waters. Under the current regime, there are three 
main players: the state owner (the central government); ownership 
agents (the local governments); and private users (individual rights-
holders). Theoretically, only the central government can represent 
the state to maintain ownership in China.84 Without the local author-
ity, it is almost impossible for the central government to exercise 
state ownership. Aligned with China’s devolution of resources from 
                                                                                                             
 83.  Although Heller has talked about an array of solutions to cure underuse 
in the anticommons, he still assumes a rigid dichotomy between open access and 
exclusive access and ignores the cooperative strategy between multi-level users. 
As he noted, “commons and anticommons tragedies mirror each other, so solu-
tions for one may inform the other;” HELLER, supra note 5, at 182. 
 84.  According to hai yu shi yong guan li fa (2002) (P.R.C.), supra note 63, 
at Art. 3, “[t]he sea areas shall belong to the state, and the State Council shall 
exercise ownership over the sea areas on behalf of the state.” 
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central to local authorities,85 local governments have the legal au-
thority to approve and supervise the use of sea areas.86 In order to 
distinguish them from the central government, which is the unique 
representative of ownership, I have designated local governments as 
ownership agents. 
Along three critical dimensions, all players may enforce cooper-
ative behavior. First, there is a fee-share arrangement between state 
owner and ownership agents. According to this system, 70 percent 
of the usage fee belongs to ownership agents while 30 percent is 
paid to the state owner.87 Similar to the sharecropping contract be-
tween landlord and workers in agricultural history, the fee-share ar-
rangement mitigates the risk of moral hazard, which can be caused 
by information asymmetry.88 
 
Figure 5. Legal Framework for Exercising Rights in China’s 
Coastal Waters 
 
                                                                                                             
 85.  Contrary to the more centralized reform in Eastern Europe and Russia, 
“China has emphasized economic reform through devolution of authority from 
the central to local governments.” Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism 
as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 86 
(1997). 
 86.  Apart from large-scale use or “key state construction projects,” most ap-
plications to use coastal waters only need to be approved by local governments. 
See hai yu shi yong guan li fa (2002) (P.R.C.), supra note 63, Art. 7, 16–18. 
 87.  See Cai Zheng Bu Gu Yu Jia Qiang Hai Yu Shi Yong Jin Guan Li De 
Tong Zhi [Notice of Ministry of Financial and State Oceanic Ministry on Collect-
ing the Use Fee in 2007]. 
 88.  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, 41 
REV. ECON. STUD. 219, 219–55 (1974); Steven N. S. Cheung, Private Property 
Rights and Sharecropping, 76 J. POL. ECON. 1107, 1107–22 (1968). 
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Second, there is also a regulatory means to resolve the hold-out 
problem, namely the functional-divisions system. This system aims 
at “ensuring the sustained utilization of sea areas and promoting the 
development of the maritime economy” by planning all coastal wa-
ters.89 In view of the process whereby the functional-divisions sys-
tem is jointly completed by multi-level governments, to some extent 
it avoids the potential hold-out problem. Ideally, by means of a func-
tional-divisions plan, which is treated as implied contractual terms, 
the state owner can impose an ex ante regulation as a solution to 
keep gridlock at bay. Normally, the hold-out phenomenon occurs 
where a large-scale project requires the consent of private users. 
However, such large-scale projects should be planned by a func-
tional-divisions system. If this is the case, it implies that private us-
ers have accepted the content of the project in advance; if not, the 
adjustment of the functional-divisions plan associated with specified 
waters is a form of regulatory undertaking. No matter which situa-
tion materializes, the hold-out gridlock will not occur. 
Finally, the market-driven system forms the basis of a solution 
to overcome gridlock. In essence, only when the negotiators believe 
that they will benefit from non-cooperative action will the anticom-
mons occur. However, for private rights-holders in China’s coastal 
waters, the non-cooperative option is not the best game plan. Most 
of them gain exclusive-use rights by bidding or auction.90 They have 
a strong incentive to avoid gridlock because underuse would seri-
ously affect the market value of the waters in the remaining contrac-
tual terms. At the very least, refusing the deal means the loss of an 
opportunity to make a profit.91 Therefore, rational individuals are 
                                                                                                             
 89.  See hai yu shi yong guan li fa (2002) (P.R.C.), supra note 63, at Art. 11. 
 90.  For example, according to the related regulation in Shanghai, “[i]n case 
of an application for the use of sea areas for business purposes, the Municipal 
Oceanic Bureau shall organize bidding or an auction for the transfer of the right 
to use sea areas;” Shang Hai Shi Hai Yu Shi Yong Guan Li Ban Fa [Procedures of 
the Shanghai Municipality on the Administration of Use of Sea Areas 2006]. 
 91.  In contrast, the risk of gridlock is much higher in land use because the 
timeless ownership may weaken the rights-holder’s incentive to make a profit. 
However, the right to use waters is not timeless and thus refusing to make a deal 
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willing to accept a good deal as long as the price is right. The same 
is true for new users. As such the potential problem of a gridlock is 
avoided through negotiations.  
V. CONCLUSION 
When a Blackacre has to be used by multiple players, there are 
two options when it comes to allocating the resource: divide it into 
small fenced-off plots (imagine cutting a big birthday cake for party 
guests); or permit the players to use the resource simultaneously 
(imagine a park crowded with people). If this Blackacre refers to 
coastal waters, aquaculture and capture are representative samples 
of each allocation. 
It is useful, then, to briefly contrast the two models. Borrowing 
Epstein’s argument, I designate the former as a bottom-up regime, 
and the latter as a top-down one. Consistent with Demsetz’s theory, 
the bottom-up regime avoids the tragedy of the commons because it 
internalizes potential externalities. But this statement begs the ques-
tion: if the big birthday cake is cut into so many pieces, will it lead 
to waste? Heller’s anticommons hypothesis says yes, but according 
to my findings, the answer is no. 
As shown by my findings, people are willing to pay for legal 
rights which guarantee exclusive access, regardless of the relatively 
high cost. The statistical data further reveal that, when coastal waters 
are divided, there is a negative correlation between fragmentation 
and production. In comparison with Heller’s assumed result, it im-
plies that the more fragmented the waters, the higher the productiv-
ity that will occur. On this basis, I might conclude that, from an em-
pirical standpoint, there is no tragedy of the anticommons in China’s 
coastal waters. 
                                                                                                             
is a lost opportunity in limited time. An assessment of the difference between land 
and waters exceeds the scope of this article, and must be deferred to a subsequent 
paper. 
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VI. APPENDIX 
A. The value of per capita GDP in all eleven coastal provinces. The 
data derive primarily from two sources: (1) China Ocean Yearbook; 
(2) China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
 2002 
GDP 
2003 
GDP 
2004 
GDP 
2005 
GDP 
2006 
GDP 
2007 
GDP 
2008 
GDP 
2009 
GDP 
2010 
GDP 
2011 
GDP 
2012 
GDP 
Shandong 11619 13628 16364 20023 23716 27721 32996 35894 41106 47335 51768 
Jiangsu 14356 16708 19944 24214 28272 33331 39053 44253 52840 62290 68347 
Fujian 13470 14941 16331 18468 21156 25607 29741 33437 40025 47377 52763 
Hebei 9091 10487 12451 14737 16694 19746 23163 24581 28668 33969 36584 
Hainan 7441 8273 9767 10804 12343 14477 17087 19254 23831 28898 32377 
Shanghai 31575 35395 43994 48435 52782 59055 63980 69164 76074 82560 85373 
Liaoning 12528 14258 15822 18974 21574 25648 31197 35149 42355 50760 56649 
Guangdon  13273 15202 20705 24327 27705 32178 36082 39436 44736 50807 54095 
Zhejiang 16323 19343 23652 26924 31038 36431 41226 43842 51711 59249 63374 
Guangxi 5092 5631 7023 8746 10232 12491 14891 16045 20219 25326 27952 
Tianjin 20369 24210 30380 35452 40412 45295 54034 62574 72994 85213 93173 
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B. The picture on the left shows the ichnography of sea areas in 
Lingshui Harbor, Hainan province. As this ichnography reveals, a 
Global Positioning System (GPS) can distinguish and locate the sec-
tioned-off sea areas, and the inherent fluidity will not prevent coastal 
waters from being turned into property. The picture on the right 
shows aquaculture production in Wenchang County, Hainan prov-
ince. 
 
 
 
 
